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Of Equal Access and Trojan Horses
Robert C. Boisvert, Jr.*
These provisions honor, in a public school setting, this coun-
try's heritage of freedom of thought and speech, and I am de-
lighted that they now become the law of the land.1
President Ronald Reagan,
upon signing
the Equal Access Act
On August 11, 1984, President Reagan signed the Equal Ac-
cess Act,2 making it the "law of the land." The Equal Access Act
3
makes it
unlawful for any public secondary school which receives Fed-
eral financial assistance and which has a limited open forum to
deny equal access or a fair opportunity to, or discriminate
against, any students who wish to conduct a meeting within
that limited open forum on the basis of the religious, political,
philosophical, or other content of the speech at such
* Robert C. Boisvert, Jr. received his J.D. in 1985 from the University of Min-
nesota Law School.
1. President's Statement Upon Signing H.R. 1310 (Education for Economic Se-
curity Act), 20 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 1120, 1121 (Aug. 11, 1984).
2. Pub. L. No. 98-377, 98 Stat. 1302 (to be cited as 20 U.S.C. § 4071 (1984)).
3. SUBCHAPTER VIII-EQUAL ACCESS
§ 4071. Denial of equal access prohibited
(a) Restriction of limited open forum on basis of religious, polit-
ical, philosophical, or other speech content prohibited
It shall be unlawful for any public secondary school which re-
ceives Federal financial assistance and which has a limited open forum
to deny equal access or a fair opportunity to, or discriminate against,
any students who wish to conduct a meeting within that limited open
forum on the basis of the religious, political, philosophical, or other
content of the speech at such meetings.
(b) "Limited open forum" defined
A public secondary school has a limited open forum whenever
such school grants an offering to or opportunity for one or more
noncurriculum related student groups to meet on school premises dur-
ing noninstructional time.
(c) Fair opportunity criteria
Schools shall be deemed to offer a fair opportunity to students
who wish to conduct a meeting within its limited open forum if such
school uniformly provides that-
(1) the meeting is voluntary and student-initiated;
(2) there is no sponsorship of the meeting by the school,
the government, or its agents or employees;
(3) employees or agents of the school or government are
present at religious meetings only in a nonparticipatory capacity;
(4) the meeting does not materially and substantially in-
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meetings.4
In effect, once a secondary school permits a "noncurriculum re-
terfere with the orderly conduct of educational activities within the
school; and
(5) nonschool persons may not direct, conduct, control, or
regularly attend activities of student groups.
(d) Federal or State authority nonexistent with respect to cer-
tain rights
Nothing in this subchapter shall be construed to authorize the
United States or any State or political subdivision thereof-
(1) to influence the form or content of any prayer or other
religious activity;
(2) to require any person to participate in prayer or other
religious activity;
(3) to expend public funds beyond the incidental cost of
providing the space for student-initiated meetings;
(4) to compel any school agent or employee to attend a
school meeting if the content of the speech at the meeting is contrary
to the beliefs of the agent or employee;
(5) to sanction meetings that are otherwise unlawful;
(6) to limit the rights of groups of students which are not
of a specified numerical size; or
(7) to abridge the constitutional rights of any person.
(e) Unaffected Federal financial assistance to schools
Notwithstanding the availability of any other remedy under the
Constitution or the laws of the United States, nothing in this sub-
chapter shall be construed to authorize the United States to deny or
withhold Federal financial assistance to any school.
(f) Authority of schools with respect to order-and-discipline,
well-being, and voluntary-presence concerns
Nothing in this subchapter shall be construed to limit the author-
ity of the school, its agents or employees, to maintain order and disci-
pline on school premises, to protect the well-being of students and
faculty, and to assure that attendance of students at meetings is
voluntary.
§ 4072. Definitions
As used in this subchapter-
(1) The term "secondary school" means a public school which
provides secondary education as determined by State law.
(2) The term "sponsorship" includes the act of promoting, lead-
ing, or participating in a meeting. The assignment of a teacher, admin-
istrator, or other school employee to a meeting for custodial purposes
does not constitute sponsorship of the meeting.
(3) The term "meeting" includes those activities of student groups
which are permitted under a school's limited open forum and are not
directly related to the school curriculum.
(4) The term "noninstructional time" means time set aside by the
school before actual classroom instruction begins or after actual class-
room instruction ends.
§ 4073. Severability
If any provision of this subchapter or the application thereof to any
person or circumstances is judicially determined to be invalid, the pro-
visions of the remainder of the subchapter and.the application to other
persons or circumstances shall not be affected thereby.
§ 4074. Construction
The provisions of this subchapter shall supersede all other provisions
of Federal law that are inconsistent with the provisions of this
subchapter.
4. 20 U.S.C.A. § 4071(a) (West Supp. 1985).
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lated 5 student group to meet on school premises during nonin-
structional time," 6 the school must permit "voluntary and student-
initiated" 7 religious8 groups the same right of access.
This article examines Congress' commitment to giving secon-
dary students a right to engage in diverse activities and concludes
that, although in enacting the Equal Access Act Congress' intent
was to encourage religious meetings in public schools, the Act's
language and supporting first amendment case law actually
strengthen secondary students' rights to participate in and be ex-
posed to intellectual diversity. The Act provides an additional
means for unpopular student groups to gain recognition and the
right to meet, adding to the diversity of student activity and bene-
fiting all secondary students.
Part I examines the politics and history of the Equal Access
Act and reveals that Congress was more concerned with protecting
religious speech than with protecting political and philosophical
speech. Part II analyzes the constitutionality of the Act and
predicts that the conservative Burger Court will hold that the
Equal Access Act does not violate the establishment clause. Part
III discusses the construction of the Act and focuses on its scope
and remedies. Finally, Part IV assesses the wisdom of the Equal
Access Act and concludes that religious meetings do not belong in
public schools. If, however, the Supreme Court upholds its consti-
tutionality, the Act will effectively strengthen students' rights to
free speech and recognize that secondary students are mature
enough to be exposed to a spectrum of ideas and viewpoints, in-
cluding unpopular ones.
I. The History and Politics of the Equal Access Act
To understand the background of the Equal Access Act, one
must view the Act for what it is: a law intended to enable student
organizations to use public secondary school facilities for religious
meetings.9 Although the Act protects political and philosophical
5. The Act does not define "noncurriculum related." See infra text accompa-
nying notes 128-139.
6. The Act defines "noninstructional time" as "time set aside by the school
before . . . or after actual classroom instruction." 20 U.S.C.A. § 4072(4) (West
Supp. 1985). See infra text accompanying notes 140-146.
7. 20 U.S.C.A. § 4071(c)(1) (West Supp. 1985). The Act prohibits nonschool
persons from organizing religious meetings using public school facilities. 20
U.S.C.A. § 4071(c)(5) (West Supp. 1985).
8. Although the Equal Access Act appears to guarantee access for religious,
political, and philosophical student organizations, this article will refer most often
to access for religious organizations.
9. See, e.g., 130 Cong. Rec. S8331-32 (daily ed. June 27, 1984) (statement of Sen.
19851
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speech, the drafters added those provisions only to appease crit-
ics'O and garner additional congressional support." Indeed, Sena-
tor Jeremiah Denton, a conservative co-author of the bill, admitted
that he had not considered any evidence that students' political or
philosophical speech was being abridged by the schools. 12 While
some legislators hoped the Act would protect the speech rights of
all students,13 many legislators hoped the primary effect would be
to advance or support religion in public schools.14
It would be disingenuous to argue that those who supported
the bill on religious grounds did not wish to advance religion in the
schools but merely hoped to create diversity among high school
student organizations. President Reagan, the Moral Majority, and
the Christian Voice did not support the Act because it would allow
in almost all speech, regardless of its popularity or general accept-
ability; they supported the Act because, although not as good as a
school prayer amendment, it was a step forward in the campaign
to get religion into the schools. Thus, the primary concern of the
legislators was access for religious organizations.
Despite public support,15 earlier legislative attempts to legal-
Hatch) (Equal Access Act intended to end confusion about permissibility of reli-
gious activities in public secondary schools); 130 Cong. Rec. S8335 (daily ed. June 27,
1984) (statement of Sen. Denton) ("[The Equal Access Act will] make it clear that
secondary school students engaging in religious speech have the same rights to asso-
ciate together and to speak as do students who wish to meet to discuss chess, poli-
tics, or philosophy.").
The sole harm that Congress sought to remedy was schools' refusal to recog-
nize religious organizations and allow them to use school facilities. For a litany of
examples of such denials see 130 Cong. Rec. S8331-35 (daily ed. June 27, 1984).
10. The American Civil Liberties Union and the National Education Associa-
tion opposed earlier drafts of the Equal Access Act but remained neutral concern-
ing the version of the bill, the Denton-Hatfield amendment, which eventually
passed. 130 Cong. Rec. S8338 (daily ed. June 27, 1984) (statement of Sen. Hatfield).
11. 130 Cong. Rec. S8344 (daily ed. June 27, 1984) (statement of Sen. Hatfield).
12. 130 Cong. Rec. S8349 (daily ed. June 27, 1984) (statement of Sen. Denton).
This does not mean that such discrimination does not exist, but merely that it was
not researched.
Student free speech rights have been recognized. The Supreme Court in
Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. School Dist. (students wearing black armbands to pro-
test Vietnam War), held that students do not "shed their constitutional rights to
freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate." 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969).
See infra text accompanying notes 154-160.
13. Stuart Taylor, School Prayer: A Trojan Horse, N.Y. Times, July 27, 1984, § 2,
at 11, col. 1.
14. Id. See, e.g., 130 Cong. Rec. S8365 (daily ed. June 27, 1984) (statement of
Sen. Baucus) ("I support this Equal Access Bill because it puts religion in the
schools, but in a way that is consistent with the Constitution.").
15. According to a Media General-Associated Press poll, 61% of Americans who
were asked said they would support a constitutional amendment allowing organized
prayer in public schools. Most favor prayer in schools, poll says, Minneapolis Star
& Tribune, Jan. 3, 1985, at A9, col. 5.
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ize organized prayer in public schools failed.16 The equal access
amendment, also known as the Denton-Hatfield amendment,17
provided an opportunity for legislators to get some religion into
the schools but in a form more palatable to organized opponents.
Noted the New York Times:
Bending itself out of shape to accommodate the pressure for
prayer in the schools, the Senate has now acted to admit a lit-
tle prayer before or after classes, but in a perversely liberal
way: it would also admit some atheism, politics and perhaps
even homosexual agitation on an equal basis.' 8
The amendment was written on the floor of the Senate19 and, be-
cause it was an amendment and not a bill, was never subject to
Senate hearings or committee reports.2 0 After only minor altera-
tions,2 1 the amendment was attached to the House-passed Emer-
gency Mathematics and Science Education and Jobs Act.2 2 The
Senate overwhelmingly approved the modified Denton-Hatfield
amendment 23 and sent it to the House of Representatives.
Upon reaching the House,24 the amendment was referred to
both the Judiciary Committee and the Education and Labor Com-
mittee.25 At this point, while the bill was in committee, substan-
16. On March 20, 1984, the Senate failed to get the two-thirds vote necessary to
pass S.J. Res. 73, a proposed amendment to the Constitution permitting voluntary
prayer in public schools. S.J. Res. 73, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983). The Senate vote
favoring the resolution was 56 to 44. 130 Cong. Rec. S2901 (daily ed. Mar. 20, 1984).
Meanwhile, the House has avoided considering school prayer amendments. 130
Cong. Rec. H3820 (daily ed. May 14, 1984) (statement of Rep. Weber) ("[It ha[s]
been over 20 years since that school prayer amendment was initially introduced and
we ha[ve] had only one opportunity, and that 13 years ago, to debate school
prayer.").
17. Senator Denton offered the original amendment on June 6, 1984. Senator
Hatfield revised the amendment on June 27, 1984. See 130 Cong. Rec. S8331 (daily
ed. June 27, 1984).
18. Schoolhouse Free-for-All, N.Y. Times, July 25, 1984, at A22, col. 1.
19. 130 Cong. Rec. H7727 (daily ed. July 25, 1984) (statement of Rep. Edwards).
20. Id. at H7728.
21. See 130 Cong. Rec. S8338-39, S8341 (daily ed. June 27, 1984).
22. H.R. 1310, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 130 Cong. Rec. H7745-56 (1984). The Emer-
gency Mathematics and Science Education and Jobs Act provides for funds to up-
grade mathematics, science, computer technology, and foreign languages instruction
and provides assistance for employment-based vocational training programs. The
equal access amendment was added to the Emergency Mathematics and Science Ed-
ucation and Jobs Act as Title VIII.
23. The Senate approved the amendment 88 to 11. See 130 Cong. Rec. S8370
(daily ed. June 27, 1984).
24. In May, the House failed to pass its own version of the Equal Access Act,
H.R. 5345, under suspension of the rules, 270 to 151. 130 Cong. Rec. H3901 (daily ed.
May 15, 1984).
25. 130 Cong. Rec. H7727 (daily ed. July 25, 1984) (statement of Rep. Edwards).
According to Jeffrey Arnold, a legislative assistant to Sen. Hatfield, it is very unu-
sual to refer a House-passed bill back to a House committee. Arnold said that this
was a tactic of the House leadership designed to keep the bill off the floor of the
1985]
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tial political jockeying occurred. Representative Carl Perkins
threatened to call the bill up for a vote pursuant to a seldom-used
procedure called "Calendar Wednesday." 26  Negotiation ensued
and House leadership agreed to permit a vote on the amendment
under suspension of the rules,27 a procedure which requires a two-
thirds vote and prohibits amendment. The House leadership
agreed that if the vote on the Denton-Hatfield amendment was
successful, a vote on the entire package would follow.28 In the
meantime, President Reagan contacted numerous representatives
and warned them that he would veto the mathematics and science
bill if it did not include the equal access amendment.29 On July 25,
House, where it would probably have passed. Telephone interview with Jeffrey Ar-
nold, legislative assistant to Sen. Hatfield (Jan. 24, 1985).
26. Telephone interview with Jeffrey Arnold, legislative assistant to Sen.
Hatfield (Jan. 24, 1985).
27. Id. The political jockeying and the expedited procedure led at least one rep-
resentative to question the validity of the amendment itself:
I am ashamed to say that we cannot fully debate the merits [of the
Equal Access Bill] today. At 6 o'clock yesterday evening, the decision
to bring this bill to the floor was made. This bill's language was passed
by the Senate on June 27, 2 days before we recessed. Now on our sec-
ond day back, we have this bill before us. I wonder how many of my
colleagues have had their staff read the almost 40 pages of Senate de-
bate in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD? How many of us know
what this language means? Even the House and Senate sponsors
don't.
Just as the sponsors are confused over the interpretation of the
equal access bill, they have created a great deal of consternation and
confusion over the procedure for consideration of the bill. A "Dear
Colleague" letter dated July 24 asked for Republican Members' sup-
port for the bill under Calendar Wednesday, allowing 2 hours of gen-
eral debate and opportunity for amendment. This morning, we
received a "Dear Colleague" [letter] addressed to all Members urging
support of the legislation under suspension of the rules, so that the
time-consuming Calendar Wednesday procedure may be avoided. The
obvious question is why were amendments touted yesterday and today
we are being asked to expedite the process? I think the answer is the
sponsors of the bill are not on a firm substantive or procedural
grounds [sic].
130 Cong.Rec. H7736 (daily ed. July 25, 1984) (statement of Rep. Fish).
28. Telephone interview with Jeffrey Arnold, legislative assistant to Sen.
Hatfield (Jan. 24, 1985).
29. Id. President Reagan, the Moral Majority, the Christian Voice, the United
States Catholic Conference, the Christian Legal Society, and numerous other con-
servative and religious organizations endorsed the Denton-Hatfield amendment.
130 Cong. Rec. S8336 (daily ed. June 27, 1984)(statement of Sen. Denton). Com-
mented Rep. Schumer:
[Y]ou should reject this [equal access] bill on the basis of the establish-
ment clause. It was said by none other than Jerry Falwell why "our
supporters" are backing this bill. Mr. Falwell said the real reason is to
get prayer back into the schools, but he said, "We knew we couldn't
win on school prayer but equal access gets us what we wanted all
along."
[Vol. 3:373
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1984, without House committee hearings or reports,30 the House
agreed 337 to 77 to pass the equal access amendment. 31 The fol-
lowing month, President Reagan signed the bill.
II. The Constitutionality of the Equal Access Act
The enactment of the Equal Access Act was preceded by
much debate concerning the first amendment's protection of free
speech and the free exercise of religion, as well as by its prohibi-
tion of government establishment of religion.32 This part discusses
Supreme Court decisions concerning conflicts between religion and
free speech and lower federal court decisions specifically regarding
equal access in public secondary schools. Finally, this part ana-
lyzes the Equal Access Act in light of these opinions.
A. The Foreshadowing: Widmar v. Vincent
In Widmar v. Vincent ,33 the Supreme Court dealt with equal
access in a university setting. In Widmar, members of a univer-
sity religious group named Cornerstone34 were denied permission
to use the facilities at the University of Missouri at Kansas City.35
The students challenged a university regulation which prohibited
use of university facilities for religious worship or teaching. 36 The
district court upheld the regulation, holding that religious speech
130 Cong. Rec. H7725 (daily ed. July 25, 1984) (statement of Rep. Schumer).
President Reagan, in his State of the Union Address, thanked Congress for
passing the Equal Access Act. Stated Reagan: "[N]o citizen need tremble, nor the
world shudder, if a child stands in a classroom and breathes a prayer. We ask you
again: Give children back a right they had for a century and a half or more." Text
of President's State of the Union Address to Congress, N.Y. Times, Feb. 7, 1985, § 2,
at 8, col. 4.
President Reagan's plea is somewhat deceptive. In calling for organized prayer
in public schools, President Reagan intimates that students are prohibited from
praying in school. This is incorrect. Although public schools cannot sanction or su-
pervise student prayer, neither can they bar individual students from praying on
their own time. Wallace v. Jaffree, 105 S. Ct. 2479, 2496 (1985) (O'Connor, J., con-
curring) ("Nothing in the United States Constitution as interpreted by this Court
... prohibits public schools from voluntarily praying at any time before, during, or
after the school day.").
30. See 130 Cong. Rec. H7736 (daily ed. July 25, 1984) (statement of Rep. Fish).
31. See 130 Cong. Rec. H7740-41 (daily ed. July 25, 1984). Having passed Title
VIII (the equal access provisions), the House passed Title I through VII (the origi-
nal Emergency Mathematics and Science Education and Jobs Act) by a vote of 393
to 15. 130 Cong. Rec. H7745 (daily ed. July 25, 1984).
32. U.S. Const. amend. I. ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establish-
ment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom
of speech .... ")
33. 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
34. Cornerstone is an evangelical Christian student group. Id. at 265 n.2.




is entitled to less constitutional protection than other types of ex-
pression and that the establishment clause in fact requires such a
regulation. 37 The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed. 38 It
held that the regulation constituted content-based discrimination
against religious speech for which the court could find no compel-
ling justification.39 According to the Eighth Circuit, the establish-
ment clause does not bar a policy of equal access.40
The Supreme Court affirmed the Eighth Circuit's ruling. The
Court found that the University had created a public forum by
permitting other student organizations to use university facilities
and that singling out religious organizations for exclusion consti-
tuted content-based discrimination.4 1 The Court rejected the Uni-
versity's argument that the exclusion was justified by the
compelling state interest of ensuring strict separation of church
and state,42 holding that equal access is not necessarily incompati-
ble with separation of church and state.43 The Court engaged in a
three-pronged analysis of the challenged regulation under the es-
tablishment clause:
First, the [governmental policy] must have a secular legislative
purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one
that neither advances nor inhibits religion . . . ; finally, the
[policy] must not foster "an excessive government entangle-
ment with religion."44
The Court noted that both lower courts had agreed that two
of the prongs were easily satisfied: the open forum policy would
have a secular purpose and would avoid entanglement with reli-
gion.45 The district court, however, had concluded that the policy
failed the second requirement of the three-prong test because al-
lowing religious groups to use university facilities would have the
primary effect of advancing religion.46 The Supreme Court dis-
agreed.47 Justice Powell, writing for an 8-1 majority, stated that
"an open forum in a public university does not confer any impri-
matur of state approval on religious sects or practices."48 In a foot-
note, Justice Powell suggested that the outcome might be different
37. Chess v. Widmar, 480 F. Supp. 907 (W.D. Mo. 1979).
38. Chess v. Widmar, 635 F.2d 1310 (8th Cir. 1980).
39. Id. at 1315-20.
40. Id. at 1317.
41. 454 U.S. at 269-70.
42. Id. at 270-71.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 271 (citing Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971)).
45. Id. at 271-72.
46. Id. at 272.
47. Id. at 273.
48. Id. at 274.
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in a public primary or secondary school setting, reasoning that
"[u]niversity students are, of course, young adults. They are less
impressionable than younger students and should be able to appre-
ciate that the University's policy is one of neutrality toward reli-
gion." 49 Additionally, argued Justice Powell, the university forum
was already open to a wide variety of nonreligious groups, all of
which benefited from open access.5 0 Powell reasoned that this di-
versity indicated that the University's equal access policy had a
secular effect.S1
B. The Lower Federal Courts and Equal Access in Public
Secondary Schools
The Supreme Court recently granted certiorari in a case
which may become the first test of the Equal Access Act. The
Third Circuit Court of Appeals decided Bender v. Williamsport
Area School District just one month before the passage of the
Act.52 In Bender, the Third Circuit rejected a student religious
group's challenge to a school policy prohibiting religious groups
from using school facilities. The case involved a student-initiated
nondenominational prayer club that had been refused permission
to meet during a regularly scheduled activity period.5 3 The district
court concluded that the school had abridged the students' first
amendment rights and rejected the school district's argument that
the establishment clause justified the infringement.54
The Third Circuit reversed. Referring to Tinker and
Widmar, the court noted that both student speech and religious
speech have some degree of protection under the first amend-
ment.55 While the first amendment does not guarantee access to
all government facilities, commented the court, the school dis-
trict's encouragement of extracurricular activities created a limited
49. Id. at 274 n.14.
50. Id. at 274. The Court suggested that the result might have been different
had the University been able to prove empirically that religious groups would
"dominate" the open forum. Id. at 275.
51. Id. at 274.
52. 741 F.2d 538 (3d Cir. 1984), reh'g denied, 741 F.2d 538 (Aug. 15, 1984), cert.
granted, 105 S. Ct. 1167 (1985). The Supreme Court might, however, sidestep the
Equal Access Act issue by deciding the case does not present a case or controversy
as "the school board itself no longer opposes the students' position, and... the in-
dividual who brought the initial appeal no longer holds any official position." Court
to Rule on Meetings of Religious C7ubs in High Schools, N.Y. Times, Feb. 20, 1985,
at A13, col. 5.
53. 741 F.2d at 541-42.
54. Bender v. Williamsport Area School Dist., 563 F. Supp. 697 (M.D. Pa. 1983).
55. 741 F.2d at 545 (citing Tinker, 393 U.S. at 503, and Widmar, 454 U.S. at 269).
19851
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open forum.56 This, in turn, obligated the district "to explain its
exclusion of a qualified group under applicable constitutional crite-
ria." 57 Because the restriction was content-based, the court deter-
mined that the proper test was whether the district's restriction
was "narrowly drawn to meet a compelling state interest." 8
In analyzing the district's contention that the exclusion was
justified by the establishment clause, the court first examined
whether the policy had a secular purpose. The court quickly dis-
posed of this first prong, noting that the purpose of the general ac-
tivity policy was to contribute to student development. 59 The
policy failed the second prong, however, because the presence of
religious groups during the school day would create the appear-
ance of government endorsement so as to have the effect of ad-
vancing religion.60 The court distinguished Widmar by the lesser
maturity of the students in Bender and the more controlled, com-
pulsory nature of high schools.61
Having established that the district had advanced a compel-
ling state interest, the court weighed the free speech rights of the
students against the district's interest in honoring the establish-
ment clause. 62 The court concluded that, in this case, 63 free speech
rights must yield to the establishment clause. This conclusion was
based on the limited nature of the high school forum and the divi-
siveness and pressures likely to result from religious activities in a
high school setting.6 4 Reasoned the court:
Instead of uniting students from varying backgrounds and be-
liefs, prayer in the public schools segregates students along
religious lines. This works to the detriment of all students,
and may particularly ostracize and stigmatize those students
who are atheists or adhere to religious beliefs not shared by
the majority of their fellow students .... Accordingly, we are
of the view that "Sacred practices of religious instruction and
prayer, [as] the Framers [of the Constitution] foresaw, are best
left to private institutions-the family and houses of
worship."65
56. Id. at 545-50.
57. Id. at 546.
58. Id. at 550.
59. Id. at 551 ("A purpose which is nonsecular ... will not be inferred
lightly.").
60. Id. at 552-55.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 557-61.
63. The court emphasized that the weighing of competing interests must be
handled on a case-by-case basis. Id. at 559.
64. Id. at 560-61.
65. Id. at 561 (quoting Brandon v. Board of Educ., 635 F.2d 971, 973 (2d Cir.
1980)).
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The Supreme Court has denied certiorari in two other cases
involving student religious groups' use of public secondary school
facilities.66 The lower courts' analyses in these two cases are help-
ful in understanding the issues raised in the public school setting
and in predicting courts' reactions to future claims under the
Equal Access Act.
In Brandon v. Board of Education ,67 several high school stu-
dents involved in a group called "Students for Voluntary Prayer"
sued the school board6 s after it refused them permission to con-
duct communal prayer meetings in a classroom before the start of
the school day.69 The Second Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed
the district court's dismissal of the students' complaint for three
reasons.7 0 First, the Second Circuit held that the students had not
shown that their free exercise rights had been abridged because
they had failed to prove they otherwise lacked facilities for com-
munal prayer.71 Second, the court agreed with the defendants' ar-
gument that the refusal was justified by a compelling state interest
in preventing the authorization of student-initiated voluntary
prayer from violating the establishment clause.72 Allowing plain-
tiffs access would violate the establishment clause, reasoned the
court, because it would impermissibly advance nonsecular inter-
ests: "To an impressionable student, even the mere appearance of
secular involvement in religious activities might indicate that the
state has placed its imprimatur on a particular religious creed.
This symbolic inference is too dangerous to permit."73 Similarly,
supervision of the group would result in impermissible state entan-
glement in religion.74
Finally, the court rejected the students' contention that the
refusal violated their rights of free speech, free association, and
equal protection. 75 The court stated that a high school classroom,
66. Brandon v. Board of Educ., 635 F.2d 971 (2d Cir. 1980), cert denied, 454 U.S.
1123 (1981); Lubbock Civil Liberties Union v. Lubbock Indep. School Dist., 669 F.2d
1038 (5th Cir. 1982), cert denied, 103 S. Ct. 800 (1983).
The reason for the denial of certiorari in Brandon is unclear and could have
been a misreading of the facts of the case. S. Rep. No. 357, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 7,
reprinted in 1984 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 2348, 2353.
67. 635 F.2d 971 (2d Cir. 1980).
68. The complaint listed as defendants the Board of Education and its individ-




71. Id. at 977-78.
72. Id. at 978-79.
73. Id. at 978.
74. Id. at 979.
75. Id. at 979-80.
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unlike a university,76 is not a "public forum" and that students'
free speech and free associational rights "are severely circum-
scribed by the Establishment Clause in the public school set-
ting."7 7 No equal protection violation existed, the court concluded,
because all religious organizations were denied access and groups
permitted access did not raise establishment clause problems.78
In Lubbock Civil Liberties Union v. Lubbock Independent
School District,79 the Lubbock Civil Liberties Union challenged a
school district policy8 0 permitting student religious groups to use
school facilities.81 The district court upheld the policy but the
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed.8 2 The court found that
the policy failed all three prongs of the tripartite establishment
clause test,8 3 commenting in dicta that a truly neutral policy giving
access to all organizations, including religious organizations, would
have the permissible secular purpose of encouraging extracurricu-
lar activities.8 4 Although this was the stated purpose of the policy,
the court noted that the language had to be analyzed in the con-
text in which it was written.8 5 In so analyzing the policy's lan-
guage, the court concluded that the primary purpose was to
76. Id. at 980 (citing Chess v. Widmar, 635 F.2d 1310 (8th Cir. 1980)).
77. Id. at 980.
78. Id.
79. 669 F.2d 1038 (5th Cir. 1982).
80. The policy, adopted in 1980, read:
The school board permits students to gather at the school with super-
vision either before or after regular hours on the same basis as other
groups as determined by the school administration to meet for any ed-
ucational, moral, religious or ethical purposes so long as attendance at
such meetings is voluntary.
Id. at 1041. The school district had a long history of establishment clause violations.
The Lubbock Civil Liberties Union (LCLU) had, for almost 10 years, challenged
school district practices including assemblies with evangelistic speakers, "morning
Bible readings over school public address systems, classroom prayers led by teach-
ers, a period of silent prayer ended by 'Amen' over school public address systems
and distribution of 'Gideon' Bibles to fifth and sixth grade students." Id. at 1039.
In 1971, under pressure from the LCLU, the district adopted a policy calling for
religious neutrality and prohibition of the complained of activities. Id. Despite this
policy, the religious activities continued. Id. at 1039-40. Further complaints
prompted the Board of Trustees in 1979 to adopt formal procedures to limit reli-
gious activities in the school district. Id. at 1040. The procedures, however, merely
instructed that religious practices should be student- rather than teacher-initiated.
Id. According to the minutes of the Board of Trustees, the procedures would
"fairly well continue ... our present practice [of religious activities in the
schools]." Id.
81. Id. at 1039-41.
82. Id. at 1039.
83. Id. at 1044-47.
84. Id. at 1044.
85. Id.
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encourage religious meetings.8 6
The policy also ran afoul of the primary effect prong of the
establishment clause test.8 7 The court held that the policy had the
primary effect of advancing religion by placing the school district's
imprimatur on religious activity.8 8 The court, citing Brandon and
the Supreme Court's footnote in Widmar, stated that primary and
secondary school students were immature, and, therefore, would
view religious meetings at the beginning or end of the school day
as vital to the schools' extracurricular programs and as implicitly
endorsed by the school district.8 9 The court rejected the school
district's contention that the policy was permissible because stu-
dents were not coerced into holding or attending religious meet-
ings held at school. 90
Finally, the court concluded that use of public school facilities
and teacher supervision of religious meetings constituted imper-
missible entanglement.91 Thus, having failed all three prongs of
the establishment clause test,9 2 the policy constituted an impermis-
sible establishment of religion. The court rejected the district's ar-
gument that the free exercise clause mandated the policy,93
holding that students were not foreclosed from practicing religion
at other times and places.94 Finally, the court refused to recognize
primary and secondary schools as "public forums." 95
In summary, lower federal courts have held that schools'
equal access policies are unconstitutional. Invoking the tripartite
test for violation of the establishment clause, these courts have
concluded that equal access policies violate the establishment
clause because their primary purpose and effect is the advance-
ment of religion. Following this reasoning, the Supreme Court
could hold that references to religious speech in the Equal Access
Act are unconstitutional.
86. Id. at 1044-45. The court noted that the preamble to the policy was "con-
cerned with religious beliefs and the place of religion in the public schools." Id. at
1044 [emphasis in original]. Indeed, the focus of the language was on students wish-
ing to meet for religious purposes, stated the court. Id. at 1044-45.
87. Id. at 1045-47.
88. Id. at 1045.
89. Id. at 1045-46.
90. Id. at 1046. Additionally, the court held that the district's "compulsory edu-
cation machinery" made students available to attend the meetings, which were im-
plicitly supported by the district. Id.
91. Id. at 1047.
92. The failure of even one prong of the tripartite test constitutes a violation of
the establishment clause. To pass constitutional muster, the challenged activity or
procedure must pass all three prongs of the test. Id. at 1044.





C. The Constitutionality of the Equal Access Act
Second-guessing the Supreme Court is risky business. Yet,
Court decisions and trends provide a strong indication that the
Court will uphold the Equal Access Act. Although the Court de-
nied certiorari in Brandon and Lubbock, as a matter of legal prin-
ciple this does not indicate the Court's position on the merits.
9 6
In Widmar the Court had very little difficulty finding that
equal access in a university setting does not violate the establish-
ment clause but is, in fact, required by the free speech clause once
a public forum is established.97 The Widmar Court disposed of
two prongs of the tripartite establishment clause test in short or-
der. First, the Court ruled that equal access does not constitute an
excessive government entanglement.98 In fact, the Court sug-
gested that attempting to exclude religious groups risked greater
entanglement. 99 Although teacher supervision is more crucial at
the secondary level, the Court's argument applies with equal force
to public secondary schools. While equal access requires some
teacher supervision of religious groups to determine whether a
group practices "good" religion or "bad" religion,10 0 barring reli-
gious organizations altogether requires constant review of student
groups and their activities.101
Second, the Widmar Court quickly concluded that equal ac-
96. Maryland v. Baltimore Radio Show, 338 U.S. 912, 919 (1950) ("[T]his Court
has rigorously insisted that ... a denial [of certiorari] carries with it no implication
whatever regarding the Court's views on the merits of a case which it has declined
to review.").
97. 454 U.S. 263, 277 (1981). See supra text accompanying notes 33-51.
98. 454 U.S. at 271-72.
99. Id. at 272 n.11.
100. 130 Cong. Rec. S8348 (daily ed. June 27, 1984) (statement of Sen. Danforth).
101. See 454 U.S. at 272 n.11.
Only last term the Supreme Court struck down New York City's use of federal
funds to pay the salaries of public employees teaching in parochial schools. In a 6-3
decision, the Court held that New York City's use of tax money to finance "shared
time" parochial school programs constituted an excessive government entangle-
ment in religion. Aguilar v. Felton, 105 S. Ct. 3232 (1985). The Court, pointing to
the "pervasively sectarian environment" in which the aid was provided and the
"ongoing inspection ... required to ensure the absence of a religious message,"
held that New York City's shared time program required a "pervasive State pres-
ence" and therefore violated the establishment clause. Id. at 3238.
Although the Supreme Court in Aguilar reaffirmed the vitality of the exces-
sive entanglement prong, it is unlikely that the Court will find the Equal Access
Act violated that prong. The program in Aguilar required administrative coopera-
tion between public and private sectarian schools and regular state monitoring of
religious schools to insure that shared time classes remained free from religious
content. Aguilar, 105 S. Ct. at 3238. While the Equal Access Act involves some de-
gree of entanglement in the form of public school teachers monitoring religious
meetings in the public classrooms, the Court is likely to view this contact as de
minimus. See Widmar, 454 U.S. at 272 n.ll ("We agree with the Court of Appeals
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cess has a secular purpose of providing a broad forum for the in-
terchange of ideas.'0 2 The courts have generally found a sufficient
secular purpose whenever the state's motive is arguably nonreli-
gious.10 3 This argument is undoubtedly available in the context of
public secondary schools.
Still, this prong is open to challenge. Even cursory examina-
tion of the legislative history of the Equal Access Act reveals that
the primary purpose of the bill was to protect religious speech and
permit some degree of religion in public schools.10 4 As in Lubbock,
the primary purpose of advancement of religion is only thinly dis-
guised in broader language.10 5
Last term the Supreme Court in Wallace v. Jaffreelo6 in-
voked the primary purpose prong in striking down Alabama's
"moment of silence" law. The Court, in a 6-3 decision, held the
statute authorizing a period of silence "for meditation or voluntary
prayer" 0 7 "was not motivated by any clearly secular purpose-in-
deed, the statute had no secular purpose."' 0 8
Despite the Court's use of the primary purpose prong in in-
validating Alabama's moment-of-silence law, it is unlikely the
Court will similarly strike down the Equal Access Act. Wallace v.
Jaffree involved a particularly egregious violation of the establish-
ment clause. The legislative history unambiguously stated that the
statute was an "effort to return voluntary prayer" to public
schools 09 and the bill's chief sponsor testified to the same effect
before the district court, adding that he had "no other purpose in
mind.""l0 Simply put, "[t]he State did not present evidence of any
secular purpose.""'
On the other hand, the legislative history of the Equal Access
Act suggests at least one secular purpose: protecting the first
amendment rights of secondary school students."12 Careful scru-
tiny of this ostensibly secular purpose, however, reveals that the
that the University would risk greater 'entanglement' by attempting to enforce its
exclusion of 'religious worship' and 'religious speech.' ").
102. 454 U.S. at 271-72 n.10.
103. Laurence Tribe, American Constitutional Law § 14-8, at 835 (1978) ("[If
[the state action] is 'arguably nonreligious,' it is sufficiently secular.").
104. See, e.g., 130 Cong. Rec. S8335 (daily ed. June 27, 1984) (statement of Sen.
Denton).
105. See supra notes 9-14 and accompanying text.
106. 105 S. Ct. 2479 (1985).
107. Ala. Code § 16-1-20.1 (Supp. 1985).
108. 105 S. Ct. at 2490.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 2483 (quoting State Sen. Donald Holmes).
111. Id. at 2490-91.
112. 130 Cong. Rec. S8337 (daily ed. June 27, 1984) (statement of Sen. Hatfield).
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primary purpose of the Act is to protect religious speech.113 Still,
the Supreme Court will unlikely inquire beyond the Act's pretex-
tual purpose of protecting first amendment freedoms.
114
Review of the Equal Access Act will undoubtedly focus on
the second prong of the establishment clause test: is the primary
effect of the Act advancement or inhibition of religion? In
Widmar, a Court footnote indicated that this question may ulti-
mately rest on the Court's perception of the maturity of secondary
school students and whether the students are likely to view equal
access as placing the state's imprimatur on religious activities."1
5
Tinker foreshadowed the result of, this inquiry and provides sup-
port for the constitutionality of the Act. In Tinker, the Supreme
Court concluded that high school students have certain first
amendment rights, including the freedom to express views on con-
troversial subjects.116 In light of the Court's weakening of the wall
of separation of church and state,"17 it would be a very small step
for the Court to extend Tinker to religious speech.118
Indeed, Professor Laurence Tribe has predicted that the
Court will extend Widmar to public secondary schools:
Notwithstanding the additional problems that might arise
when religious meetings are conducted on the campus of a
public secondary school, I believe that the same conclusion [as
the Court reached in Widmar] should follow in that context,
provided only that the student meetings at issue are not state-
initiated, school-sponsored, or teacher-led in any way that
might lead to direct or indirect coercion of any student."19
The Equal Access Act avoids the problems that Professor Tribe
enumerates and is likely to survive intact the Supreme Court's
scrutiny.
113. See supra notes 9-14 and accompanying text.
114. See 105 S. Ct. at 2490 ("For even though a statute that is motivated in part
by a religious purpose may satisfy the first criterion ... the First Amendment re-
quires that a statute must be invalidated if it is entirely motivated by a purpose to
advance religion.") (emphasis added) (citing Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374
U.S. 203, 296-303 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring)); Id. at 2495 (Powell, J., concur-
ring) ("[Tihe Court is 'reluctan[t] to attribute unconstitutional motives to the state,
particularly when a plausible secular purpose may be discerned from the face of the
statute.' ") (quoting Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 394-95 (1983)).
115. See supra text accompanying note 49.
116. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 511.
117. See infra note 194.
118. For a discussion see Lowell Sturgill & Nancy Oliver, Religious Expression
in the Public School Forum. The High School Student's Right to Free Speech, 72
Geo. L.J. 135 (1983); Note, The Constitutional Dimensions of Student-Initiated Reli-
gious Activity in Public High Schools, 92 Yale L.J. 499 (1983).
119. Equal Access: A First Amendment Question: Hearings on S. 815 and S. 1059
Before the Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983) (letter of Laurence
Tribe, prof. Harvard Law School).
[Vol. 3:373
OF EQUAL ACCESS AND TROJAN HORSES
A slight chance exists, however, that the Supreme Court will
find that the Equal Access Act has the primary effect of advancing
religion and therefore violates the establishment clause. In Grand
Rapids School District v. Ball,120 the Court held that paying public
school teachers with public funds to teach parochial school pro-
grams had the primary effect of advancing religion and was uncon-
stitutional. Justice Brennan, writing for a 5-4 majority, observed
that the aid, in effect, subsidized the religious schools and that
public school employees teaching in parochial schools might "be-
come involved in intentionally or inadvertently inculcating partic-
ular religious tenets or beliefs."121 Furthermore, the shared time
programs had the primary effect of advancing religion because
they 'may provide a crucial symbolic link between government and
religion, thereby enlisting-at least in the eyes of impressionable
youngsters-the powers of government to the support of the reli-
gious denomination operating the school."' 22
A public school employee teaching in a parochial school ad-
mittedly communicates a stronger message of state endorsement of
a particular religion than does a general public school policy al-
lowing all student religious groups access to classrooms during
noninstructional time. Nonetheless, permitting religious groups to
use public school facilities conveys a message of governmental en-
dorsement of religion. Additionally, as schools start restricting ac-
cess to conventional religions only and barring unpopular religions
and cults, they will convey a message of government endorsement
of particular religions. In both cases, the primary effect is the ad-
vancement of religion in violation of the establishment clause.123
Using the reasoning of Lubbock, Brandon, and Bender, the
Supreme Court could and should sever the references to religious
groups from the Act as violative of the establishment clause, leav-
ing only the protections for political and philosophical speech.1 24
This approach adheres to the establishment clause and still pro-
120. 105 S. Ct. 3216 (1985). Ball, decided the same day as Aguilar v. Felton, 105
S. Ct. 3232 (1985), held that New York City's shared time program excessively en-
tangled government and religion and therefore was unconstitutional.
121. 105 S. Ct. at 3223.
122. Id. at 3223-24. Wrote Justice Brennan: "The symbolism of a union between
church and state is most likely to influence children of tender years, whose experi-
ence is limited and whose beliefs consequently are the function of environment as
much as of free and voluntary choice." Id. at 3226.
123. "[T]he government [must] maintain a course of neutrality among religions,
and between religion and nonreligion." Id. at 3222.




vides students with diverse viewpoints a right of access, as well as
providing all secondary students with the benefits of diversity.
III. Construing the Equal Access Act
A. Threshold Definitions
To activate the Equal Access Act, a public secondary school125
receiving federal financial assistance must have a "limited open fo-
rum."126 A limited open forum exists when "noncurriculum re-
lated student groups . . . meet on school premises during
noninstructional time." 27 This definition raises two issues. First,
what is a "noncurriculum" related student group?" Second, what is
"noninstructional time?"
The Equal Access Act does not define "noncurriculum re-
lated student groups." The definition is of initial importance be-
cause a school can avoid the reach of the Act by permitting only
curriculum related student groups to meet.
The issue of defining a noncurriculum related student group
is likely to arise in one of two scenarios. In the first scenario, the
Act will force a school administration wishing to establish a policy
barring student religious organizations from using school facilities
either to drop noncurriculum related activities or to redefine and
reorganize such activities to make them curriculum related. In the
second scenario, the Act will force a school administration consid-
ering ad hoc a student religious group's request to use school facili-
ties to analyze its roster of student organizations to determine if
some groups are noncurriculum related so as to create a limited
open forum and thus require equal access.
A dictionary definition of "curriculum" is "courses offered by
an educational institution."' 28 The Act's legislative history sup-
ports this definition 29 and indicates that the Equal Access Act
125. The original bill, S. 1059, applied to all public schools, primary and secon-
dary. S. 1059, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984).
126. 20 U.S.C.A. § 4071(a) (West Supp. 1985).
127. 20 U.S.C.A. § 4071(b) (West Supp. 1985).
128. Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary 277 (8th ed. 1981).
129. Senator Mark Hatfield, a co-author of the Denton-Hatfield amendment
which later became the Equal Access Act, defined curriculum related activities as
"extension[s] of the classroom." A key factor in this determination is school spon-
sorship. Thus, examples of curriculum related activities include Spanish or French
clubs, school bands, and football teams. Examples of noncurriculum related activi-
ties include chess clubs, Young Democrats, and Young Republicans. 130 Cong. Rec.
S8342 (daily ed. June 27, 1984) (statement of Sen. Hatfield). The outer limits of this
definition are unclear. For example, could a school make a quasi-religious course
(e.g., history of religion) part of the curriculum so as to permit orthodox religious
groups to meet as curriculum related activities without creating a limited open fo-
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does not limit the discretion of the school district to draw the line
between curriculum related and noncurriculum related activi-
ties.130 The legislative history suggests factors for determining
whether or not an activity is curriculum related. An activity is
more likely to be considered curriculum related if it corresponds
to at least one course offered by the school and if it is faculty su-
pervised. 131 These factors are manifestly imprecise. Therefore,
while part of the purpose of the Equal Access Act was to reduce
the confusion surrounding use of public school facilities by student
religious organizations,132 confusion and litigation will continue as
school districts search for a workable definition of curriculum re-
lated activities.' 33
The Equal Access Act's inclusion of political and philosophi-
cal speech creates an interesting problem. To bolster its constitu-
tionality in the face of the establishment clause,134 the Act
requires that religious meetings be voluntary and student-initi-
ated,135 and prohibits teacher participation. 136 Ironically, the
drafters included political and philosophical speech in the bill
merely to ensure passage of the religious speech portion and by in-
cluding them, needlessly subjected them to the bill's separation of
church and state provisions. In other words, "[t]he teacher or ad-
ministration employee participation in the political [i.e., nonreli-
gious, noncurricular] club can be no greater than its very limited
participation in the religious club. .. ,"137 Thus, "[a] school-spon-
sored political debate, a teacher-led political discussion, or a
school-financed noncurricular United Nations Day" all could vio-
late the Equal Access Act.138 Such a restriction serves no useful
purpose 139 and will, in all likelihood, harm the development of stu-
rum? This approach probably violates the establishment clause. See supra text ac-
companying notes 32-95.
130. 130 Cong. Rec. S8342 (daily ed. June 27, 1984) (colloquy between Sen.
Hatfield and Sen. Gorton).
131. Id.
132. 130 Cong. Rec. S8335 (daily ed. June 27, 1984) (statement of Sen. Denton).
133. 130 Cong. Rec. S8367 (daily ed. June 27, 1984) (statement of Sen. Gorton).
134. 130 Cong. Rec. S8342-43 (daily ed. June 27, 1984) (colloquy between Sen.
Hatfield and Sen. Gorton).
135. 20 U.S.C.A. § 4071(c)(1) (West Supp. 1985).
136. 20 U.S.C.A. § 4071(c)(3) (West Supp. 1985).
137. 130 Cong. Rec. S8343 (daily ed. June 27, 1984) (statement of Sen. Gorton).
138. 130 Cong. Rec. S8349 (daily ed. June 27, 1984) (statement of Sen. Denton).
139. Observed Senator Evans:
No one would object to a faculty adviser working with the chess club
or the debate team; however, if these activities are now considered
noncurriculum related they are no different than a student religious
group, thus subject to the school board's same uniform requirements.
What we are really saying is that a school cannot sponsor a noncur-
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dent political and philosophical groups.
"Noninstructional time" is another term which is important
in the operation of the Act. A limited open forum exists when
schools permit noncurriculum related student groups to meet on
school premises during noninstructional time.140 The Act defines
"noninstructional time" as "time set aside by the school before ac-
tual classroom instruction begins or after actual classroom instruc-
tion ends."14 1 It appears that school authorities could permit
noncurriculum related groups to meet only during instructional
periods so as to avoid creating a limited open forum requiring ac-
cess by religious organizations. Neither the Act nor its legislative
history addresses such questions of circumvention, 142 perhaps be-
cause school authorities probably would not choose such a disrup-
tive or circuitous route of circumvention.
The Equal Access Act defines noninstructional time as all
time before or after the school day.1 43 Some debate exists as to
whether this interpretation excludes lunch periods and free peri-
ods set aside during the school day. Senator Mark Hatfield, a co-
sponsor of the bill and the author of the perfecting amendment
which passed in final form,144 interpreted noninstructional time as
all time before or after the school day, not including lunch and
free periods. Senator Jeremiah Denton, a co-sponsor and the au-
thor of the predecessor bil,145 accepted the perfecting amendment
but interpreted noninstructional time as including lunch and free
periods.146 It is unclear which position is correct, although Senator
Hatfield's approach is closer to the literal wording of the Act.
riculum activity whether that activity is debate, chess, or organized
religious devotions.
130 Cong. Rec. S8367-68 (daily ed. June 27, 1984) (statement of Sen. Evans).
140. 20 U.S.C.A. § 4071(b) (West Supp. 1985).
141. 20 U.S.C.A. § 4072(4) (West Supp. 1985).
142. The House did briefly mention possible attempts to define "noninstructional
time" in such a way as to defeat the purpose of the Act. 130 Cong. Rec. H7735-36
(daily ed. July 25, 1984) (statement of Rep. Bonker).
143. 20 U.S.C.A. § 4072(4) (West Supp. 1985).
144. 130 Cong. Rec. S8353 (daily ed. June 27, 1984) (statement of Sen. Hatfield).
145. Senator Denton's original bill, S. 1059, did not define "noninstructional peri-
ods." A committee report, however, interpreted the term to include time before
and after "the regular school day, as well as a lunch period, a study hall period, a
homeroom period in which student choice of extracurricular activities is allowed, or
a student activity period set aside for meetings of voluntary extracurricular student
groups." S. Rep. No. 357, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 38, reprinted in 1984 U.S. Code Cong.
& Ad. News 2348, 2384.
146. 130 Cong. Rec. S8356 (daily ed. June 27, 1984) (statement of Sen. Denton).
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B. Scope of the Equal Access Act: What Groups
Get Access?
The Equal Access Act on its face bars discrimination against
political and philosophical, as well as religious, student groups.
Many legislators and others supporting the Act solely for its pro-
tection of religious speech relied on the policing mechanisms con-
tained in the Act to counteract its potential protection of groups
which they considered objectionable. The language of the Act and
prior case law, however, indicate that these exceptions are not so
easily invoked.
Three different situations illustrate the limits of Congress'
commitment to political and philosophical speech. In the first situ-
ation, a group of students14 7 requests to use school facilities to hold
a religious cult meeting. In the second situation, a student group
advocating an unpopular political viewpoint makes a similar re-
quest. Organizations typically associated with this scenario include
the Ku Klux Klan, the Nazi Party, the Young Communist League,
and the Social Democrats. In the final situation, a student group
advocating particular social or civil rights, such as a gay rights or-
ganization, requests to use school facilities to hold a meeting.
Although Congress probably did not want to allow these kinds of
groups to meet in secondary schools, the Equal Access Act appears
to guarantee them the same rights enjoyed by other more conven-
tional noncurriculum related student groups. In order to take ad-
vantage of this protection, however, unpopular groups will have to
argue that they are not excluded under the policing provisions of
the Act.
The Equal Access Act contains a number of policing provi-
sions with which unpopular groups attempting to gain access must
contend. The school need not provide access if the meeting "mate-
rially and substantially interfere[s] with the orderly conduct of ed-
ucational activities"'148 or if the meeting is unlawful.149 Similarly,
the Act expressly refuses to limit a school's authority "to maintain
order and discipline on school premises, to protect the well-being
of students and faculty, and to assure that attendance of students
at meetings is voluntary."150
The primary issue raised by these exceptions in the Act is
147. Where an activity is not student-initiated, the Equal Access Act is not appli-
cable and the school is free to bar the activity. 20 U.S.C.A. § 4071(c)(1), (5) (West
Supp. 1985).
148. 20 U.S.C.A. § 4071(c)(4) (West Supp. 1985).
149. 20 U.S.C.A. § 4071(d)(5) (West Supp. 1985).
150. 20 U.S.C.A. § 4071(f) (West Supp. 1985).
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whether school administrators must wait to see if a group causes a
disruption or, instead, may determine in advance that a group is by
its nature disruptive and summarily bar the group from access. Do
the provisions of the Equal Access Act mean that school adminis-
trators can exclude groups merely because they consider them to
be "bad?"151 Or must the group be doing something illegal, dan-
gerous, or disruptive at its meetings to justify exclusion?152
The language of the "material and substantial interference"
clause of the Act, taken literally, permits exclusion of a group only
when actual disruption occurs.15 3 Congress borrowed the phrase
"materially and substantially interfere" from Tinker v. Des Moines
Independent School District,154 a Supreme Court case upholding
secondary students' right to wear black armbands in public schools
to symbolize their protest of the Vietnam War. In Tinker, the
Court stated that potential discomfort is not a sufficient ground for
abridging speech.155 Noted the Court:
[I1n our system, undifferentiated fear or apprehension of dis-
turbance is not enough to overcome the right to freedom of ex-
pression. Any departure from absolute regimentation may
cause trouble. Any variation from the majority's opinion may
inspire fear. Any word spoken, in class, in the lunchroom, or
on the campus, that deviates from the views of another person
may start an argument or cause a disturbance. But our Consti-
tution says we must take this risk; and our history says that it
is this sort of hazardous freedom-this kind of openness-that
is the basis of our national strength and of the independence
and vigor of Americans who grow up and live in this relatively
permissive, often disputatious, society. 156
In Tinker's terms, a meeting of an unpopular organization involves
151. "'Bad' group" is merely shorthand for any of a number of unpopular groups
traditionally viewed by society with dislike or distrust.
152. Treating high school students as adults includes exposing them to all groups
and letting them arrive at their own conclusions. While suppressing such unpopu-
lar ideas or groups is more tidy and convenient, it insulates students from reality
and does not eliminate the hate group. Moreover, attempts to bar nonviolent hate
groups will undermine the efforts of other groups, viewed with equal disdain by
overprotective school administrators, to gain access. Even adults, however, may
need protection from groups that practice violence. Clearly, a school should be free
to bar a group which conspires to oppress or commit violence, or in fact commits
acts of oppression or violence.
153. "There is nothing in this statutory language that talks about... [meetings]
possibly being disruptive." 130 Cong. Rec. S8345 (daily ed. June 27, 1984) (state-
ment of Sen. Metzenbaum) (emphasis added).
154. 393 U.S. 503, 509 (1969). That the authors borrowed language from Tinker is
clear from the legislative history. See, e.g., S. Rep. No. 357, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 40,
reprinted in 1984 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 2348, 2386; 130 Cong. Rec. S8348
(daily ed. June 27, 1984) (statement of Sen. Denton).
155. 393 U.S. at 509 (citing Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (5th Cir. 1966)).
156. 393 U.S. at 508-09 (citation omitted).
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"pure speech" 5 7 and pure speech enjoys "comprehensive protec-
tion under the First Amendment,"s58 even in a high school set-
ting.15 9 So the material and substantial interference clause will
almost certainly be interpreted in accord with Tinker, thereby per-
mitting unpopular groups to use school facilities for meetings. 160
Court decisions permitting unpopular access will undoubtedly
come as a surprise to numerous legislators who supported the Act
primarily for its religious access provisions, 161 relying on the mate-
rial and substantial interference clause to restrict access of unpop-
ular organizations. 162 During Senate debate, co-sponsor Senator
Mark Hatfield stated that school authorities could bar divisive
groups because school settings are "volatile."163 The language of
the statute, however, admits of no such interpretation and is un-
ambiguous so as to make unnecessary any reference to the Act's
legislative history. Moreover, the legislative history, even if re-
ferred to, is inconsistent with the approach taken by the federal
courts in pure speech cases. Argued Senator Slade Gorton during
Senate debate on the equal access bill:
I am convinced that the limited open forum which ... Sena-
tor [Mark Hatfield] has described clearly covers the Ku Klux
Klan-as long as it agrees not to engage in any violent activ-
ity-clearly allows an organization, discussions of which in-
volve promoting the idea of racial superiority of one group or
another; clearly beyond the slightest peradventure of argu-
ment protects a gay rights organization in a school.164
Another major policing provision is the Danforth amend-
ment,165 which states that schools retain the authority to maintain
discipline, protect student and faculty well-being, and assure that
student attendance at meetings is voluntary.166 The provision is
157. Id. at 505-06.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 506.
160. Two senators who opposed the bill share this interpretation. Said Senator
Metzenbaum: "I think the issue is this: Can a school board stop some groups from
using their facilities? Unless an organization is there to be disruptive or to break
the law, I read the language. . . as saying that they cannot." 130 Cong. Rec. S8345
(daily ed. June 27, 1984) (statement of Sen. Metzenbaum). Senator Gorton agreed
with this interpretation. See irnfra text accompanying note 164.
161. Taylor, supra note 13.
162. 130 Cong. Rec. S8343 (daily ed. June 27, 1984) (statement of Sen. Hatfield).
163. Said Senator Hatfield, "I think anything like that [Nazi Party, Ku Klux
Klan], that is dedicated to the purpose of dividing people, on grounds of race or reli-
gion could be disruptive in as volatile a situation as a school." Id.
164. 130 Cong. Rec. S8344 (daily ed. June 27, 1984) (statement of Sen. Gorton).
165. The Danforth amendment was incorporated into the Denton-Hatfield
amendment as a modification to the Hatfield Amendment. See, 130 Cong. Rec.
S8341 (daily ed. June 27, 1984).
166. 20 U.S.C.A. § 4071(f) (West Supp. 1985).
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not a grant of authority but merely a reaffirmance of current po-
licing authority. Courts adhering to Tinker are unlikely to be sat-
isfied by mere threat of disruption as a justification for barring
student access.167
The most noteworthy aspect of the Danforth amendment is
the voluntariness clause. The voluntariness clause was intended as
an anti-cult device designed to permit school authorities to inter-
vene if students are being "brainwashed."'168 Even without the
Danforth amendment, school administrators faced with a cult ac-
tually "brainwashing" students would undoubtedly have the au-
thority to intervene. Of course, it is the very enactment of the
Equal Access Act which allows religion into the schools in the first
place and places school administrators in the impossible position of
having to distinguish cults from acceptable religions, and then
monitor the behavior of both.169
C. Remedies
The Equal Access Act contains no enforcement mechanism
and no express remedy. It does, however, explicitly forbid with-
holding federal financial assistance from any school which violates
the Act.170 Predecessor bills provided for federal fund cut-offsl71
and the bill which served as a basis for the Denton-Hatfield
amendment 172 provided for damages or equitable relief or both
167. See supra text accompanying notes 153-160.
168. 130 Cong. Rec. S8348 (daily ed. June 27, 1984) (statement of Sen. Danforth).
Said Danforth:
Under this amendment, as it is presently drafted at least, it is the in-
tent of the author of this language that it would continue to be possi-
ble for the school boards and the school administration to take such
action as is necessary to prevent kids from being in effect brainwashed
within the school premises; that is to say, in the event that, for exam-
ple, a cult were to set up a cell, hold meetings, attempt to go out, draw
other kids into this religious organization, and use what amounts to
psychological warfare in order to accomplish that objective.
Id.
169. As Senator Denton put it, "[W]e still have a problem determining what is a
good and what is a bad religion." 130 Cong. Rec. S8348 (daily ed. June 27, 1984)
(statement of Sen. Denton). Of course, before the enactment of the Equal Access
Act, schools were not burdened with making this determination.
For purposes of this article, it is not important to distinguish between cults and
religions. The Equal Access Act suggests that students should be exposed to di-
verse, and even unpopular, ideas, not just conventional ideas. The Act protects
smaller, less popular groups by prohibiting schools from "limit[ing] the rights of
groups of students which are not of a specified numerical size." 20 U.S.C.A.
§ 4071(d)(6) (West Supp. 1985).
170. 20 U.S.C.A. § 4071(e) (West Supp. 1985).
171. See, e.g., H.R. 2732, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983); H.R. 5345, 98th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1984).
172. S. 1059, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984).
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and action by the attorney general. 7 3 The Equal Access Act ap-
pears to leave the question of remedies to the courts. This section
discusses the likelihood that courts will recognize either an im-
plied cause of action or a cause of action under section 1983 and
concludes that the courts will probably recognize both remedies.
These remedies should be available to all student groups seeking
access to public secondary school facilities.
1. Recognition of an implied private remedy.
The analytical framework for finding an implied private rem-
edy from a federal statute was set out by the Supreme Court in
Cort v. Ash .174 A court must inquire:
First, is the plaintiff "one of the class for whose especial bene-
fit the statute was enacted ... ?" Second, is there any indica-
tion of legislative intent, explicit or implicit, either to create
such a remedy or to deny one? Third, is it consistent with the
underlying purposes of the legislative scheme to imply such a
remedy for the plaintiff? And finally, is the cause of action
one traditionally relegated to state law,. . . so that it would be
inappropriate to infer a cause of action based solely on federal
law? 7 5
Four years later, the Court reformulated Cort's four seem-
ingly independent factors 176 into the test currently used by the
Supreme Court.177 It later reaffirmed the reformulated Cort test
in Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington :1zs
The central inquiry remains whether Congress intended to
create, either expressly or by implication, a private cause of ac-
tion. Indeed, the first three factors discussed in Cart -the lan-
guage and focus of the statute, its legislative history, and its
purpose-are ones traditionally relied upon in determining
legislative intent.179
As recently as 1984, the Supreme Court indicated that the refor-
mulated Cort test remained vital. In Daily Income Fund, Inc. v.
Fox,180 the Court reiterated that legislative intent is the touch-
173. Id. §§ 3-4.
174. 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
175. Id. at 78 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original) (quoting Texas & Pac.
Ry. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33, 39 (1916)).
176. Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979).
177. For a thorough analysis of the development of the implication doctrine, see
George Brown, Of Activism and Erie-The Implication Doctrine's Implications for
the Nature and Role of the Federal Courts, 69 Iowa L. Rev. 617 (1984); see also, Su-
san Gluck Mezey, Judicial Interpretation of Legislative Intent The Role of the
Supreme Court in the Implication of Private Rights of Action, 36 Rutgers L. Rev.
53 (1983).
178. 442 U.S. 560 (1979).
179. Id. at 575-76 (citation omitted).
180. 104 S. Ct. 831 (1984).
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stone in inferring an implied right of action.' 8 ' The Court noted
that factors in discerning legislative intent include "the legislative
history and purposes of the statute, the identity of the class for
whose particular benefit the statute was passed, the existence of
express statutory remedies adequate to serve the legislative pur-
pose, and the traditional role of the states in affording the relief
claimed."1 8 2
The Supreme Court has made the second Cort factor, legisla-
tive intent to create or deny an implied remedy, the single most
important criterion in implication cases. Indeed, one commentator
has suggested that the inquiry into implied remedies begins and
ends with legislative intent.18 3 Although the legislative history of
the Equal Access Act is silent on the question of remedies, 8 4 some
suggest that Congress intended to leave the task of selecting reme-
dies to the courts. 8 5 Senator Hatfield, in discussing promotion of
religious activities by teachers, alluded to remedies:
[W]henever any violation of this occurs the House bill provided
for Federal cutoff of Federal moneys. We provided here due
process and an implied judicial remedy. In other words, what
we are trying to do is to take away the Federal cutoff of funds,
and all of that would be found in the formal procedures that
are set forth. I do not think we can set it here.186
He made no other attempt to elaborate on the phrase "due process
and an implied judicial remedy." Conversely, the legislative intent
nowhere suggests an intent to deny an implied remedy. 8
7
The silence of the Equal Access Act on the question of reme-
dies bolsters this interpretation. Logic dictates that a statute creat-
ing a right in a private plaintiff' 8 8 includes some form of
remedy.'8 9 When a statute creates no express remedy, "implica-
tion may be the only way to avoid drawing the unlikely conclusion
181. Id. at 839.
182. Id.
183. Mezey, supra note 177, at 71.
184. According to Jeffrey Arnold, a legislative assistant who worked on the
Equal Access Bill, Congress' silence on the issue of remedies was intentional.
Arnold said there were three primary reasons for the silence: 1) to give flexibility
in shaping remedies to the courts, 2) to discourage lawsuits and encourage settle-
ment, and 3) to avoid snags in getting the bill through Congress. Telephone inter-
view with Jeffrey Arnold, legislative assistant to Sen. Hatfield (Jan. 24, 1984).
185. Arnold supports this interpretation. Id.
186. 130 Cong. Rec. S8355 (daily ed. June 27, 1984) (statement of Sen. Hatfield).
187. Evidence of legislative intent to deny a cause of action is rare. Brown,
supra note 177, at 633.
188. See infra text accompanying notes 195-197.
189. Comment, Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida. Tribal Rights of Ac-
tion and the Indian Trade and Intercourse Act, 84 Colum. L. Rev. 1852, 1866
(1984).
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that Congress legislated entirely in vain."190 At the very least, the
Act's silence rules out one argument that courts commonly use in
refusing to infer remedies: expressio unius.91
Finally, it is clear from the legislative history that the pur-
pose of the Equal Access Act was to apply Widmar v. Vincent,192
recognizing a right of equal access in a public university setting, to
public secondary schools.' 93 The remedy sought by the excluded
student religious group in Widmar was a declaratory judgment
and injunctive relief.' 94 Arguably, Congress intended the Act it-
self to provide the remedies sought by the Widmar plaintiffs.
More likely, Congress intended to extend only the right of access
to public secondary school students and left its implementation
and enforcement for the courts.
In the original Cort test, the first factor was whether the
plaintiff is "one of the class for whose especial benefit the statute
was enacted."' 95 It is unclear how much weight is to be accorded
this factor and the Supreme Court has been inconsistent in its han-
dling of the matter.' 96 Several commentators agree that the first
factor is of relatively little importance.
97
Regardless of its weight, the first factor can only help plain-
tiffs under the Equal Access Act. The Act unequivocally grants
public secondary school students the right to use school facilities
during noninstructional hours once a limited open forum exists.
In other words, high school students wishing to use school facili-
190. Id. (citing Kendall v. United States, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524 (1838)).
191. See, e.g., Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington:
[Section] 17(a) [of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934] is flanked by
provisions of the 1934 Act that explicitly grant private causes of action.
Section 9(e) of the 1934 Act also expressly provides a private right of
action. Obviously, then, when Congress wished to provide a private
damages remedy, it knew how to do so and did so expressly.
442 U.S. 560, 571-72 (1979) (citations omitted).
192. 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
193. See, e.g., 130 Cong. Rec. S8331-32 (daily ed. June 27, 1984) (statement of Sen.
Hatch).
194. Chess v. Widmar, 480 F. Supp. 907, 908 (W.D. Mo. 1979).
195. 422 U.S. at 78 (emphasis in original).
196. Notes one commentator:
Forced to defend Cort as something that it is not, the Supreme Court
engages in continuing reformulation of the factors and refinement of
their application. For example, the first factor- concerning the exist-
ence of rights-benefits or duties--appears to play a major role in the
opinion denying a right of action in Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington
[442 U.S. 560, 569-71 (1979)]. On the other hand, the Court in Merrill
Lynch [456 U.S. 353 (1982)] found an implied right, but virtually ig-
nored the first factor.
Brown, supra note 177, at 635.
197. Id. at 634; Mezey, supra note 177, at 65-66.
1985]
Law and Inequality
ties have the right not to be discriminated against based on the
political, philosophical, or religious content of their speech.
The third Cort factor is whether an implied private remedy is
consistent with "the underlying purposes of the legislative
scheme."' 9 8 This test has a very low threshold and courts have ex-
pressed an attitude that the more enforcement the better.199 Thus,
the Equal Access Act probably satisfies the third factor. Permit-
ting aggrieved students to bring an action under the Act is clearly
consistent with the Act's goal of ensuring political, philosophical,
and religious organizations the same right of access as other stu-
dent groups enjoy. Making a right enforceable is undoubtedly con-
sistent with the granting of that right. Moreover, portions of the
Act's legislative history indicate that Congress intended just such a
remedy. 200
The final Cort factor focuses on whether the area is one typi-
cally governed by state law.20 1 The courts give little weight to this
factor because "[t]he presence of a federal norm creates a strong
temptation to declare the area federal."20 2 Moreover, the protec-
tion of constitutional rights is traditionally an area governed by
federal law. Finally, the legislative history indicates that confusion
among courts, school boards, and students as to the permissibility
of religious organizations using public school facilities concerned
Congress.20 3 Elimination of this confusion requires uniformity
among the states.
Thus, it is quite likely that the federal courts will find an im-
plied private remedy from the Equal Access Act despite the
Supreme Court's recent pruning of the implication doctrine.2 04
While the Court has been reluctant to infer a remedy in cases in-
volving statutes with weak legislative histories, 205 the legislative
history of the Equal Access Act strongly suggests Congress in-
tended to imply a remedy. Furthermore, the implication doctrine
is "inherently capable of manipulation," 206 a fact of which the con-
servative Burger Court is probably aware. The Court has been
chipping away at the wall of separation between church and
198. 422 U.S. at 78.
199. Brown, supra note 177, at 633.
200. See supra text accompanying notes 184-194.
201. 422 U.S. at 78.
202. Brown, supra note 177, at 633.
203. See, e.g., 130 Cong. Rec. S8336 (daily ed. June 27, 1984) (statement of Sen.
Denton); id. at S8331-32 (statement of Sen. Hatch).
204. Mezey, supra note 177, at 65-66.
205. See, e.g., 442 U.S. at 568, 571.
206. Brown, supra note 177, at 644.
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state20 7 and has recognized a right of equal access in a public uni-
versity setting.20 8 Thus, despite the "unpredictable and chaotic" 20 9
state of the law of implied rights of action, it is likely that the
courts will, at least in a religious speech case, find that the Equal
Access Act contains an implied right of action. Once the courts
have recognized an implied right of action for religious groups,
political and philosophical groups will probably also be able to sue
under the Act.
2. Private right of action under section 1983.
The Court's constriction of the implication doctrine has led
numerous plaintiffs to invoke section 1983210 to enforce federally
guaranteed rights.211 To ascertain whether a plaintiff can main-
tain a section 1983 action, the court must inquire into two essential
elements: "(1) whether the conduct complained of was committed
by a person acting under color of state law; and (2) whether this
conduct deprived a person of rights, privileges, or immunities se-
207. Norman Redlich, Some Cracks In The Wall, 239 Nation 277, 280 (1984) ("[A]
shifting majority of the Burger Court, while paying lip service to Jefferson's meta-
phorical 'wall of separation' between church and state, is unfortunately taking the
politically expedient route of permitting government accommodation to dominant
religious views.").
See, e.g., Lynch v. Donnelly, 104 S. Ct. 1355 (1984) (holding that city's display of
nativity scene did not violate the establishment clause).
Last term the Supreme Court seemed to toll the erosion of the wall of separa-
tion between church and state. In Wallace v. Jaffree, 105 S. Ct. 2479 (1985), the
Court ruled unconstitutional Alabama's moment-of-silence statute authorizing a pe-
riod of silence "for mediation or voluntary prayer" in public schools. In two rulings
the Court struck down the use of the money to finance shared time religious school
programs. Grand Rapids School Dist. v. Ball, 105 S. Ct. 3216 (1985); Aguilar v. Fel-
ton, 105 S. Ct. 3232 (1985). Finally, in Estate of Thornton v. Calder, Inc., 105 S. Ct.
2914 (1985), the Court ruled that a Connecticut statute granting Sabbath observers
an absolute right not to work on their Sabbath had the primary effect of advancing
religion and thus violated the establishment clause.
It would be premature as well as foolhardy to suggest that the Supreme Court
is moderating its stand on separation of church and state. A more accurate inter-
pretation is that a sharply divided Court (6-3 in Wallace and Aguilar and 5-4 in
Ball) invalidated laws representing particularly egregious government intrusions
into religion.
208. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
209. Brown, supra note 177, at 635.
210. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1981) reads:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia,
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or
other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or
other proper proceeding for redress.
211. Mezey, supra note 177, at 76.
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cured by the Constitution or laws of the United States." 212
The requirement that the impermissible conduct be under
color of state law should be easy to satisfy in a typical claim
brought under the Equal Access Act. In the typical case, a student
group will submit a request to the school administration or the
school board. Courts will almost certainly consider any action
taken by the school authorities to be under color of state law.
That was the reasoning of the district court in Brandon v. Board of
Education. 213 In Brandon, the principal of the high school, the su-
perintendent of the school district, and the Board of Education all
denied the request of a student religious group to use a classroom
before each school day to conduct a communal prayer meeting.
214
Although the court ultimately granted the defendants' summary
judgment on other grounds,215 it ruled that the defendants' actions
constituted state action so as to permit a cause of action under sec-
tion 1983.216 This conclusion was based on the court's determina-
tion that the defendants were "charged with the supervision of
public schools pursuant to statutory authority."2 1 7
The second inquiry in a section 1983 case is whether the con-
duct deprived the complainant of rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution or federal law. In the case of a reli-
gious group seeking access, it would seem that a plaintiff could ar-
gue that prohibiting student religious groups from using school
facilities violates the constitutional guarantees of free speech, free
association, free exercise of religion, and equal protection. The
courts, relying primarily on the establishment clause, have not in-
terpreted section 1983's protections as creating a right of equal ac-
cess for students wishing to use public secondary school facilities
for religious purposes. 2 18 It would seem, then, that secondary
school students attempting to meet for religious purposes will have
to rely on the Equal Access Act if they are to have a cause of ac-
tion in such situations.
It is well established that a federal statutory law may serve as
an independent basis for a cause of action under section 1983.219
212. Parratt v..Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535 (1981).
213. 487 F. Supp. 1219 (N.D.N.Y. 1980), rev'd on other grounds, 635 F.2d 971 (2d
Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1123 (1981).
214. Id. at 1222.
215. Id. at 1233.
216. Id. at 1225-26.
217. Id. at 1226.
218. See, e.g., Brandon v. Board of Educ., 635 F.2d 971, 977-79 (2d Cir. 1980).
219. Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1 (1979). The Thibbutot Court, in reaching its
conclusion, gave the phrase "and laws" used in § 1983 its plain meaning. Id. at 4.
Additionally, noted the Court, Congress had not taken action in response to numer-
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To determine if an individual may use section 1983 to sue under a
federal statute, a court must examine congressional intent.22 0 The
inquiry focuses on whether the inclusion of statutory remedies re-
flects Congress' intent to preclude a section 1983 action; the more
comprehensive the remedial provisions of a statute, the more
likely Congress intended to preclude actions under section 1983.221
The Equal Access Act's complete lack of remedy provisions creates
a strong inference that Congress intended to permit section 1983
actions to enforce the Act. While the legislative history does not
go so far as to state that Congress intended to preserve a cause of
action under section 1983, it does suggest that the question of rem-
edies was intentionally left to the courts.222 Although recent years
have seen a constriction of causes of action under section 1983,223
the conservative Burger Court might well be swayed by the merits
of an Equal Access Act case to recognize a section 1983 action
under the Act.2 24
IV. The Wisdom of the Equal Access Act
In all likelihood, the Equal Access Act is constitutional 225 and
does provide a private cause of action.226 But that does not mean
that it is good policy. In fact, the Equal Access Act is bad policy, at
least to the extent that it permits religious groups to meet in pub-
lic schools. Experience should tell us that public education is not
the place for something as private and potentially divisive as reli-
gion.2 27 As Representative Gary Ackerman noted during House
debate on the equal access bill:
It has lately become politically very chic to flaunt one's reli-
ous Supreme Court cases interpreting § 1983 as providing a remedy for violation of
federal statutory law. Id. at 8.
220. Mezey, supra note 177, at 88.
221. Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453
U.S. 1, 20 (1980).
222. See supra text accompanying notes 184-191.
223. Mezey, supra note 177, at 88.
224. See supra text accompanying notes 207-208.
225. See supra text accompanying notes 32-124.
226. See supra text accompanying notes 170-224.
227. Explained Justice Brennan:
For just as religion throughout history has provided spiritual com-
fort, guidance, and inspiration to many, it can also serve powerfully to
divide societies and to exclude those whose beliefs are not in accord
with particular religions or sects that have from time to time achieved
dominance. The solution to this problem adopted by the Framers and
consistently recognized by this Court is jealously to guard the right of
every individual to worship according to the dictates of conscience
while requiring the government to maintain a course of neutrality
among religions and between religion and nonreligion.
Grand Rapids School Dist. v. Ball, 105 S. Ct. at 3222.
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gion. Everyone from Jesse Jackson to Ronald Reagan speaks
of bringing Christian values and traditions to Government. As
a Member of Congress who is not a Christian but who is none-
theless very proud of his religion, this troubles me. As a per-
son whose grandparents and ancestors were persecuted
throughout recorded history because their religious beliefs did
not jibe with the mainstream, this trend frightens me.22z
Supporters of the Act respond that the Equal Access Act is
well within the bounds of the Constitution and in no way man-
dates religion in the classroom.229 Certainly the Act is less consti-
tutionally repugnant than, say, a mandated school prayer.230 The
point is, however, that the Equal Access Act represents both an
alarming legislative trend and an important first step toward in-
fusing more and more religion into the classroom. As one newspa-
per editorial wondered, "Why is the concept of keeping public
schools completely separate from sectarian religious activity so
hard for some legislators to accept?"231
Equally distressing is the Act's pretextual protection of other
forms of speech in order to enact a bill intended solely to protect
religious speech. An examination of the legislative history of the
Equal Access Act exposes the web of hypocrisy on which the Act
rests. For example, freedom of speech is discussed with much en-
thusiasm when that freedom will be exercised by a conventional,
mainstream group,232 but that enthusiasm is noticeably lacking
when the freedom of speech is to be exercised by an unpopular
group. 233 There seems to be freedom of speech if a "good" group
exercises that freedom.
This exposes an even greater hypocrisy. Supporters of the
Equal Access Act argue that the Act recognizes teenagers as ma-
ture and sophisticated individuals capable of resisting peer pres-
sure.234 Thus, argue supporters, students will not feel coerced into
joining a religious group nor will they be ridiculed for their partici-
pation or nonparticipation. Yet, an almost convulsive fear exists
among the Act's supporters that fanatical religious, political, and
social groups will descend upon unsuspecting students who will be
228. 130 Cong. Rec. H7733 (daily ed. July 25, 1984) (statement of Rep.
Ackerman).
229. See, e.g., 130 Cong. Rec. S8337 (daily ed. June 27, 1984) (statement of Sen.
Hatfield).
230. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
231. Equal Access Revised, Wash. Post, July 25, 1984, § 1, at 16, col. 1.
232. See, e.g., 130 Cong. Rec. S8337 (daily ed. June 27, 1984) (statement of Sen.
Hatfield).
233. See, e.g., id. at S8343-44; id. at S8349 (statement of Sen. Denton).
234. See, e.g., 130 Cong. Rec. S8338 (daily ed. June 27, 1984) (statement of Sen.
Dixon).
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powerless to resist.235 Apparently, legislators believe either that
high school students are mature enough to resist mainstream
groups but not mature enough to resist unpopular groups, or that
high school students are not mature enough to resist either main-
stream or unpopular groups but they do not care if students are
coerced into joining "good" religious groups. Put another way, the
Equal Access Act tells teenagers, "You are mature enough to resist
joining a 'good' group but not mature enough to resist joining a
'bad' group."2 36 The maturity argument, like the Act's "protec-
tion" of political and philosophical speech, is mere pretext in-
tended to defeat future establishment clause objections. The Act is
cast, however, in terms of diversity and, therefore, should be inter-
preted as treating teenagers as mature enough to freely analyze,
discuss, and promulgate any and all ideas, whether popular or
unpopular.
At a very practical level, the Equal Access Act will embroil
public schools in even more litigation.237 If a school allows popular
groups to meet and excludes controversial or fringe groups, unpop-
ular groups will probably sue the school for denying equal access;
if a school allows any religious groups to meet, proponents of sepa-
ration of church and state will probably sue the school under the
establishment clause.238 This may lead some schools to take the
safe road and avoid creating a limited open forum by banning all
student extracurricular activities.239
Still, the Equal Access Act is not all gloom and doom. Ad-
ministered evenhandedly, it will genuinely empower teenagers by
exposing them to a variety of ideas and viewpoints. 240 Teenagers
will be exposed to popular and unpopular ideas, be they political,
235. For a discussion of the maturity of teenagers and courts' treatment of it, see
Note, The Constitutional Dimensions of Student-Initiated Religious Activity in
Public High Schools, 92 Yale L.J. 499 (1983).
236. Representative Ackerman pointed out the pretextual nature of the maturity
argument:
A scant few days ago we. .. declared that we no longer trust 18- and
19-year-olds or even 20-year-olds to exercise a rational and careful
judgment not to drive after they drink. The peer pressure would be
too strong, we said. Yet today we are on the verge of declaring that
young children, some as young as 11 and 12 and 13 years, in our junior
high schools have the courage and the wisdom and the maturity to
stand up to the peer pressure that would be exerted on them to prac-
tice and participate in the religious beliefs of their friends in their own
public school building.
130 Cong. Rec. H7733 (daily ed. July 25, 1984) (statement of Rep. Ackerman).
237. Taylor, supra note 13.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Nat Hentoff, 'Equal access' offers teenagers a chance to grow, Minneapolis
Star & Tribune, Sept. 18, 1984, at A15, col. 1.
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philosophical, or religious. This, in turn, is a crucial first step to-
ward ensuring that teenagers are capable of thinking for them-
selves.241 Of course, the Supreme Court had already recognized
these rights in Tinker, and thus we are once again reminded that
the real purpose of the Equal Access Act is to put religion into the
schools.242
V. Conclusion
The Equal Access Act's legislative history indicates that the
Act is a blatant push to get religion into the public schools in viola-
tion of the establishment clause. Although the Supreme Court
could sever the Act's religious speech provisions, it will probably
uphold the entire Act's constitutionality. Congress intended the
Act's policing provisions to keep unpopular groups from meeting
in public schools but the Act should, in light of first amendment
case law, enable virtually all groups to meet. Moreover, the courts
will probably interpret the Act as providing a remedy for any stu-
dent group denied access to public secondary school facilities.
Thus, the Equal Access Act should prove to be invaluable to stu-
dents interested in hearing and sharing diverse ideas. Observed
one writer: "As most teen-agers will tell you, it's hard to find
many adults who see teen-agers as individuals. But unwittingly, as
is his custom, Reagan has signed a bill affirming that teen-agers
can be trusted to think for themselves." 243
241. See id. The author argues that students are unable to think and function
because they are insulated from divisive issues. It is this, the author argues, that
makes students susceptible to proselytizing by cults.
242. Although the Equal Access Act applies only to public secondary schools, it
is likely that attempts will be made to extend the Act. Commented Senator
Denton: "A sealed door has had its seal broken. We can probably get [the Equal
Access Act] to grade schools." Schoolhouse Free-for-All, N.Y. Times, July 25, 1984,
at A22, col. 1.
243. Hentoff, supra note 240.
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